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1 Introduction
We evaluate the economic impact of government expropriation of private property on the
stock prices of the parent company. As far as we know, this article is the most thoroughgoing
empirical research to date on this subject. Previous literature has focused on either one eco-
nomic sector, like Shcherbakova (2010), who studies seven nationalization processes affecting
the energy sector, or one country, as the analysis of equity transfers in China by Gao and Kling
(2008).
We de￿ne an expropriation as the seizing, by the sovereign, of privately owned tangible
property, with a view towards its continued operation (Truitt, 1970); in that sense, it is an act
of a ￿rm’s involuntary divestment 1. Still, expropriations are not illegal per se2. In fact, many
countries have laws allowing the government the right to expropriate private property to ad-
dress public issues, such as development or environmental matters. Therefore, as Sloane and
Reisman (2004) point out, the "practice of eminent domain" is not likely to disappear. Even
more, resource nationalism in the last decade has generated an increase in the number of
expropriations occurring all over the world3.
Although news on expropriation-related events are likely to generate a market reaction
with respect to the stock prices of both parent and subsidiary companies, there is a lack of
empirical evidence on this subject in extant literature. Our paper aims to ￿ll this gap. We
de￿ne two broad types of events. We distinguish between warnings and forced divestments.
What we call pre-expropriation warnings relates to references to expropriation or national-
ization publicly made by the government, but do not imply the de￿nite loss of property or
control rights over the production unit. These can be: (i) Announcements of nationalization,
(ii) Announcements of expropriation, (iii) Occupations, (iv) Threats, and (v) Transitory permit
revocations. Thereupon, warningsmay be followed by several government actions. These are
what we call forced divestments. We consider three types of government actions: (i) Outright
expropriation, (ii) Forced sale and (iii) Permanent rescission of permit or concession. Our basic
hypothesis is that expropriation-related events are bad news for future performance of parent
companies and therefore their market value will decrease when these events are known. We
make one exception in the case of forced sales, where we expect themarket to have a positive
reaction, due mainly to a correction of parent ￿rms’ valuation.
The event study methodology comes as a handy tool for this paper by providing a mea-
sure of stockholders’ wealth change in the light of a given unanticipated event; see Brown and
Warner (1980). In that fashion, if expropriation related announcements are to some extent
unexpected, one should observe an abnormal market reaction. Whether this reaction an-
ticipates the event, occurs during, or after the event, depends on the level of informational
ef￿ciency of the markets.
Speci￿cally, we investigate the short-term impact of events related to government expro-
priation of private property on the stock prices of the publicly listed parent companybymeans
of a unique database of 116 events in 12 countries from 2005 to 2013. Although our results
should be read with caution given our small sample sizes for the individual event types, we
￿nd signi￿cant negative effects associated with several kinds of warnings; the larger effect is
when the warning takes the form of a transitory revocation of a permit. In the case of forced
1Kobrin (1980) uses the term ’forced divestment’ in order to group the different types of governments’ seizing.
In this section, we use the term expropriation to refer to any act of involuntary divestments indistinctly.
2According to Sloane and Reisman (2004), there seems to be a consensus in tribunals in that governmental
conduct is determinant to de￿ne state responsibility in an expropriation action.
3It is worth noting that we do not study ’creeping’ expropriation, which involves governments’ increasing their
take through taxes or other mechanisms, as these acts do not imply the loss of property or control rights of the
￿rm.
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divestments, we ￿nd a signi￿cant negative impact when there is a permanent revocation of a
permit. However, stock prices react positively to forced sales. Thus empirical evidence sup-
ports our basic hypotheses in almost all cases.
Although it is not uncommon to ￿nd event studies relating stock market reactions to po-
litical events (e.g. Dube et al. (2011), Luechinger and Moser (2014)) there is relatively scarce
literature on the effect of expropriations. Shcherbakova (2010) carries out an event study on
the market impact of eight high pro￿le regulatory events in the energy sector: nationalization
and de-nationalization decrees. These events affect ￿rms operating in Russia, Venezuela and
Bolivia. Her results show that negative events generate abnormally low returns, while the one
positive event in her sample generates abnormally high returns. However, there are some
problems in the de￿nition of at least one event4, and she centers the estimation window for
normal returns on the expropriation event date. This decision is problematic because it rules
out the possible impact of information leakages or previous announcements. Besides that,
the event would affect not only the abnormal returns, but also the normal returns (MacKinlay,
1997).
Gao and Kling (2008) analyze the market reactions to equity transfers in China. They cat-
egorize equity transfers into four categories, including privatization and nationalizations, un-
derstanding these as the stock transfer from the State to a legal person or vice versa. They
￿nd that while privatizations have positive effects on returns of the privatized ￿rm, the stock
market perceives nationalizations as a bad signal for future stock performance. Neverthe-
less, since they only analyze the announcement of stock transfers, it is not possible to know
whether these nationalizations occurred as a forced divestment or as a voluntary action exe-
cuted by the ￿rm.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we de￿ne the type of events that we study,
and hypothesize about their effect on the parent ￿rm’s stock price. We describe the event
study methodology in Section 3 and set up the framework for the selection of events and
data in Section 4. Empirical results and robustness are presented in Section 5, while Section
6 shows possible variables explaining the cumulative abnormal returns. Section 7 concludes
the paper.
2 De￿nition of events: warnings and forced divestments
In this section, we de￿ne all the events considered in the paper and hypothesize about their
likely effects on the stock prices of parent ￿rms. We start by stating the obvious: The expected
effect of expropriations on the value of the parent ￿rm is negative. This happens because in
many occasions, governments may not compensate the parent ￿rm, and even if they do, such
indemnity may be below fair value. Besides, although it is true that parent ￿rms may start a
legal arbitration in international courts against the expropriator governments, it is also true
that: (i) these processes are far from being inexpensive, and (ii) the governments, as sovereign
entities, may choose not to indemnify the demanding ￿rm, even if the court rules so.
However, there may be many governmental actions related to an expropriation. In this
paper, we separate the expropriation-related events into two categories (i) pre-expropriation
warnings, and (ii) forced divestments5. What we call pre-expropriation warnings relates to
references to expropriation or nationalization publicly made by the government, but do not
imply the de￿nite loss of property or control rights over the production unit. Thereupon,
4For example, in the case of the second oil nationalization in Venezuela, there is an additional phase for ￿rms
to conclude the forced sale to PDVSA. Shcherbakova (2010) did not consider this stage.
5We borrow this term from Kobrin (1980), in order to avoid confusion between outright expropriation and
nationalization.
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warnings may be followed by several government actions. For example, after an expropri-
ation threat, the ￿rm’s assets may be seized later on. We name the actions leading to the
effective loss of rights over the business as forced divestments. By differentiating between
these two broad categories, it is possible to determine the extent to which themarket consid-
ers the warnings as credible signals and whether they can be useful to anticipate the forced
divestments. Below, we de￿ne each type of action and discuss its expected effects.
2.1 Pre-expropriation warnings
In general, we expect pre-expropriation warnings to have a negative impact on the value of
the parent ￿rm, even if the warning does not imply the immediate loss of its property/control
rights over the facility. The reason for this is that warnings can be interpreted either as cred-
ible signals of future expropriation, or as a way to put pressure on the ￿rm to increase gov-
ernment’s in￿uence. We describe the ￿ve types of warnings below, as well as their possible
effect on the parent ￿rms’ stock returns.
2.1.1 Announcements of nationalizations
These may refer to: (i) The government pursuing a broad policy within a given industry or
sector, affecting more than one ￿rm6, (ii) The government announces its intention of taking
over a given ￿rm and establishes a deadline to negotiate its fair value.
The effect of this type of event on stock prices of the parent company is far from clear. On
the one hand, in the end, the announcementmay notmaterialize. On the other hand, if it does
materialize, a nationalization process may end up as an outright expropriation if both parties
are not able to come to an agreement, or as the complete opposite: a satisfactory negotiation
process for both parties. Overall, the uncertainty about the outcome of the announcement (no
action, negotiation, expropriation) makes it dif￿cult to ascertain the de￿nite result. Therefore,
an attitude of ’wait and see’ may be a reasonable market response.
Hypothesis 1a Announcements of nationalizations donot have clear effects on the stock price
of parent ￿rms
2.1.2 Announcements of expropriations
In these cases, the government addresses its action towards a particular ￿rm, or set of ￿rms,
without a nationalization decree backing up the decision, or simply commanding the forceful
possession of the ￿rm’s assets. Expropriations are unilateral decisions made by the govern-
ment, and compensation for the expropriated assets may seem an unlikely outcome. If the
stock market considers these announcements as credible, its reaction towards the parent’s
company value is likely to be negative.
Hypothesis 1b Announcements of expropriations affect negatively the stock price of parent
￿rms.
2.1.3 Occupations
Occupations refer to events in which the government orders the intervention of the plants
without previous notice. Since an occupation can be temporary (common in Venezuela), un-
less it comes with an explicit announcement of assets to be seized, an occupation is not con-
sidered an expropriation7. These may have a negative impact on the parent ￿rm’s stock re-
turns for two reasons. First, investorsmay interpret it as the clear intention by the government
6For a brief illustration of the phases of a nationalization process, see Figure A.1 in the Appendix A.
7Whenever the announcements of occupation and expropriation coincided, the event was taken as an outright
expropriation.
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to seize the business. Second, it shows an unfriendly relationship between the government
and the ￿rm, at least from the sovereign side.
Hypothesis 1c Occupations have a negative effect on the parent ￿rm’s stock return.
2.1.4 Threats to expropriate or nationalize
The government threatens publicly with either nationalization or expropriation. This threat
may, or may not, be ful￿lled afterwards. Threats should generate negative stock returns for
the parent ￿rms as well. If the threat is to expropriate, then it signals that the ￿rm is under the
government’s watch. If the threat is to nationalize, it may not be asworrisome to investors, but
it still predicts that the ￿rmwill operate under worse terms –that is, if it reaches an agreement
with the government.
Hypothesis 1d Threats have a negative impact on the stock returns of the parent ￿rms.
2.1.5 Transitory revocation of permit
Either the permits necessary to operate a certain project are temporarily suspended or the
government puts the renewal of the concession on standby. This action violates a previous
renewal agreement. However, at this stage, the government has not made any resolution re-
garding the ￿rm’s assets.
This type of announcement implies a cease of activities for the subsidiary or project, and it
is likely to generate a negative effect on the stock price of the parent￿rmdue to: (i) a disruption
of operating income, and (ii) the government signaling a desire either to increase its take, or to
expropriate the￿rm/project (perhaps to sell it to a higher bidder). This effectmaybe especially
large for some ￿rms in the sample, which have a large dependence on the concessions being
revoked.
Hypothesis 1e Transitory revocations of permits have a negative effect on the parent ￿rm’s
stock returns.
2.2 Forced divestments
Keeping in mind that expropriations are sovereign actions that parent companies may chal-
lenge on the courts, but without a guaranteed success, they are ’catastrophic’ events8 for par-
ent ￿rms. However, not all expropriation-related actions have the same degree of severity, so
the stock market’s reaction will likely differ from one type of action to another.
2.2.1 Forced sales
Forced sales usually involve an agreement between the ￿rm and the government. Typically, a
forced sale is the result of a negotiation process with the sovereign, in which a State Owned
Enterprise (SOE) buys the privates’ assets and pays a stipulated compensation. In this sense,
we may interpret these actions as a not-so regular asset sale9 by the parent company to the
government. In general, voluntary asset sales are associated with positive mean excess equity
returns on the day of the announcement (Clayton andReisel, 2013). However, given the special
characteristics of the deal, a forced sale might have two counteracting effects –one positive,
and one negative. We argue that the combined impact of these two effects is likely to be
8We use this term based on the de￿nition of catastrophe risk provided by Banks (2005): man-made or natural
events that occur with low frequency and may result in substantial economic damage.
9In our sample, we dealmostly with asset purchases by the government, sincemany of the nationalized entities
are projects or small ￿rms directly controlled by a multinational, parent ￿rm. If this were not the case, we should
consider a different kind of acquisition.
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positive. The negative effect is associated with an adverse market reaction: The transfer of
assets may be set below fair value, so that the market punishes such unfair sale.
The positive effect may be explained by two mechanisms. On the one hand, the govern-
ment announces nationalizations with anticipation, and the process’s results are uncertain.
This uncertainty is likely to generate volatility in the relevant stock market before the govern-
ment makes its decision to nationalize. In view of that, by the time of nationalization, the fact
that such uncertainty is resolved may result in a positive market reaction –kind of a rebound
effect-, especially if we consider that the market may have incorporated the expropriation
into its valuation during the nationalization process. What is more, a nationalization implies
that (i) there is a purchase –and not an asset seizure- made by the government, and (ii) since
the ￿rm’s relationship with the government is still ’amicable’, it lets the door open to new in-
vestment possibilities in the country10.
Hypothesis 2a Forced sales have a positive effect on the parent ￿rm’s value.
2.2.2 Outright expropriations
Outright expropriations differ in substance from forced sales. An outright expropriation is the
forceful possession of the ￿rm’s assets by the government. Compensation may be sought by
the ￿rm, through lobby or litigation, or may be granted by the government in rather excep-
tional cases. However, there is no agreement regarding the asset transfer between the ￿rm
and the government before the expropriation. We categorize two types of events as outright
expropriation:
(i) When a forced sale does not come to good terms, and the two parties do not reach an
agreement.
(ii) Seizure of the ￿rm’s assets.
These events are the most catastrophic ones within our study, since they imply a total loss of
property rights by the ￿rm, in most cases without a fair compensation. Therefore, we expect
the stock price of parent ￿rms to experience a signi￿cant decline.
Hypothesis 2b Outright expropriations have a negative impact on the value of the parent￿rm.
2.2.3 Permanent revocation of permits
These events happen in situations in which the ￿rm had obtained a license to operate a facil-
ity for a speci￿c time period, but the property rights over the facility have always belonged to
the state (e.g. mining concessions). We refer to a permanent revocation of permits when the
government sets a deadline to return the facility to the sovereign, violating a previous renewal
agreement. We expect the stock market to react negatively towards these events. Although
their effect may be similar to an outright expropriation, there is an important difference be-
tween both types of events: while outright expropriations refer to property rights, revoked
concessions usually affect only control rights.
Hypothesis 2c Permanent revocations have a negative impact on the value of the parent ￿rm.
10As implausible as this may sound, there are cases of ￿rms investing again in the host country, even if it had
assets nationalized by the same ruling government. For instance, France’s Total and Spain’s Repsol, subject to Oil
nationalization decrees in Venezuela, still operate in the country through new investments.
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3 Event study set-up
In order to determine whether the stock price has an abnormal reaction to pre-expropriation
warnings and forced divestments, we use the traditional event-studymethodology, which es-
timates abnormal returns as out-of-sample predictions (see Brown andWarner (1980, 1985)).
Figure 3.1 depicts the time-line of a traditional event study. The The ￿rst step is to specify the
model generating normal or predicted returns: the returns an investor would expect to re-
alize had the event not occurred (see Campbell et al. (1997), Brown and Warner (1980, 1985),
and Kothari and Warner (2007)). This benchmark is to be estimated within a period prior to
the event –the estimation window-, excluding the event itself to provide estimators that are
free of the in￿uence of the event’s effects. The estimation window should be long enough to
capture the normal returns. Using the notation in Figure 3.1, the estimation window in our
model is [T0, T1] = [ 245, 6].
Figure 3.1: Time line for an event study
There are several types of statistical models generating normal returns, like the constant
mean return model, and the market adjusted return model (see MacKinlay (1997)). In this pa-
per, we use the market model (eq. 1), which assumes the expected return of the security to
vary both over time and across securities. It expresses the return on every security as a sys-
tematic risk component, which is a proportion  i of the market return11, rm,t, plus a residual
ui,t that is speci￿c to the ￿rm, and uncorrelated to the market12 (Rosenberg, 1981).
ri,t = ↵i +  irm,t + ui,t (1)
After estimating normal returns, the abnormal performance of a stock is measured as the
difference between ex-post and predicted returns during the event window; that is, we com-
pute the error term as follows (out-of-sample basis):
ARi,t = ui,t = ri,t   rˆi,t (2)
then, CARs –cumulative abnormal returns- are calculated to account for the possibility that
the event’s effects develop over time. Therefore, we accumulate abnormal returns over the





At this point, there are two important issues to address. First, the event window length is
a central question when setting up an event study, but despite its importance for the analy-
sis, there is no general agreement among researchers on its proper length. MacKinlay (1997)
suggests using [ 1,+1], but other windows are common. For example, Dube et al. (2011) use
11Park (2004) suggests including exchange rates in eq. 1 for international event studies. Shcherbakova (2010)
includes the oil price in eq. 1 to conduct her event study on oil ￿rms. We do not include any additional variables,
but we re￿ne this speci￿cation using a sectoral index in order to control for sector-speci￿c dynamics.
12We assume that E[ui,t] = 0, since the unexpected returns in an ef￿cient market cannot systematically differ
from zero, and that var[ui,t] =  2i,t.
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[0, 15], Luechinger and Moser (2014) use [0, 1], and Miyajima and Yafeh (2007) use [ 5,+5]. As
a baseline speci￿cation, we consider ￿ve days before the announcement and ￿ve days after
the announcement –that is, the conservative [ 5,+5] interval13- because such speci￿cation
allows for exploring whether the market is able to anticipate the events (by including in the
analysis some days prior to the event) or if the market needs a few days to re￿ect the impact
of the news on the market prices14 (by including in the analysis some days after the event).
Second, using conventional inference methods in event studies poses a problem because
stock prices are not normally distributed, and returns may be subject to cross sectional cor-
relation (see Brown andWarner (1980, 1985), and Campbell et al. (1997)). This has led to the use
of non-parametric tests, usually more powerful than their parametric counterparts in these
cases. In order to establish the signi￿cance of cumulative abnormal returns, we use the Gen-
eralized Rank Test proposed by Kolari and Pynnonen (2011), which distributes asymptotically
as a Student’s t, with T   2 degrees of freedom. The authors have shown this test to be robust
to return serial correlation, event-induced volatility, and cross-sectional correlation resulting
from clustering. However, because we deal with very small samples for some event types, we
also calculate the test’s exact distribution, building on the idea that percentile ranks distribute




In order to de￿ne the events we study, we follow the approach proposed by Kobrin (1980,
1984). The author constructs the most comprehensive database of forced divestments acts
to 1980 in order to analyze their determinants, accounting for political, legal, ￿nancial and
economic factors15. Even though the aims and scope of our paper differ from those of Kobrin
(1980), his framework to de￿ne an act of involuntary divestment is our starting point to de￿ne
the events that we study16.
In that sense, the ￿rst step to look for events of forced divestment is to determine the char-
acteristics that de￿ne such an action. An event enters our sample if it has the three following
characteristics. First, the divestment is involuntary and forced by the host government. Since
ourmain purpose is to understand how￿rms react to political risk -particularly, expropriation
risk-, which concerns the protection of property rights in the host country, we exclude ￿rms
that have been nationalized as part of any bail-out program. For instance, our sample does
not include banks and ￿nancial ￿rms nationalized because of the recent Global Financial Cri-
sis. Second, the forced divestment directly affects the property or control rights, and not the
bene￿ts associated with operations. Therefore, we exclude ’creeping expropriation’ from our
sample. Thismeans that the event of renegotiation of contracts only enters the databasewhen
it implies a threat to the ￿rm’s operations. Finally, the targeted property is privately owned by
either national or foreign agents.
13Wider windows increase the probability of confounding events entering into the computation of CARs, which
may generate a bias in the results. We exclude events from our sample that are subject to confounding events
during the 11-day window, centered on the event day.
14The speed of the reaction of the market depends on the relative impact of the frictions to trade (liquidity,
transaction costs, limits on short positions and so on), as well as the time the news on the event take to arrive in
the home market.
15His work was extended by Minor (1994) and Hajzler (2012).
16However, there are two differences between Kobrin’s de￿nitions and ours: (i) he accounts for cases in which
non-governmental agents force divestments, but we consider governmental agents only, and (ii) an event enters
his sample only if it regards targeted foreign property, but we consider also local property.
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However, as explained in Section 3, we also analyze announcements or transitory actions
associated with factual forced divestments. That is, we consider announcements, threats,
temporary occupations and transitory permit revocations when they signal the government’s
intention to force a ￿rm’s divestment.
We obtained the events in our sample through an extensive news search mainly through
Abi-Inform, which is a database that contains key business publications, with a large interna-
tional coverage. However, in some cases it was necessary to complete the information with
additional sources, such as￿rms’ press releases, and local newspapers. Our baseline data, pre-
sented in Table 4.1, includes 116 events, involving 70 publicly traded ￿rms whose operations
resulted threatened and/or affected in 12 countries between 2005 and 2013. Venezuela and
Bolivia account for themajority of cases, with 54.3% and 13.8% of the total number of events17.
Table 4.1: Events by type
Event type Frequency Proportion of the Total
Announcement of nationalization 37 31.9
Announcement of expropriation 1 0.86
Occupation 11 9.48
Threat 22 18.97
Revocation of permit 6 5.17
Pre-ExpropriationWarnings 77 66.38
Outright expropriation 21 18.1
Forced sale 14 12.07
Permanent Rescission of Contract 4 3.45
Forced divestment 39 33.62
Total sample 116 100.00%
Table 4.2 presents the results in termsof industry sectors for the total sample, pre-expropriation
warnings and forced divestments. Although our results are not directly comparable to other
studies on expropriations (e.g. Kobrin (1980), Minor (1994) and Hajzler (2012)), the ￿gures ob-
tained for the groupof forceddivestments offer some insight on the evolutionof the industries
that have been historically affected by expropriation-related actions. In our sample, between
2005 and 2013, more than 50% of the events are related to mining and oil services (ICB codes
0001 and 1000) while the average of acts18 affecting ￿rms in these sectors between 1960 and
2006 is close to 30%. Forced divestments of ￿rms associated with utilities account for 23.08%
of the cases that we study, well above the 8.8% average registered between 1960 and 2006
(Hajzler, 2012). The fact that these trends still hold goes in line with the twomain explanations
presented in Kobrin (1980) to understand why these sectors are such popular targets for host
governments. On the one hand, communications and utilities are considered key to national
security. On the other hand, extractive industries are attractive targets if the economy largely
depends on them, as in the cases of Venezuela, Bolivia and Zimbabwe.
Another way to assess the importance of these sectors for host governments is to deter-
mine the proportion ofwarnings in each sector thatmaterialized into forced divestments. The
last column in Table 4.2 shows the materialized warnings as a percentage of the total warn-
ings. In other words, it represents the number of forced divestments preceded by warnings,
as a proportion of total warnings. On average, this proportion is close to 50%. Although these
results may have some caveats19, we may see that for ￿rms in the ￿nancial sector (ICB 8000),
17Our baseline data includes only 116 events because we excluded ￿rms affected by confounding effects: events
unrelated to those in our sample that may affect the parent ￿rm’s stock price and bias our results (see McWilliams
and Siegel (1997), MacKinlay (1997)). Appendix B presents a frequency table of events by type that accounts for all
the events affected listed ￿rms that we found while conducting this research.
18An act is de￿ned by Kobrin (1980, p. 72) as "the forced divestment of any number of ￿rms in a single industry
in a single country in a given year", and this is the de￿nition followed by Minor (1994) and Hajzler (2012).
19Since we do not have the universe of pre-expropriation warnings and forced divestments, it may be the case
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Table 4.2: Frequency of events by ICB industry
All Pre-Exprop. Warnings Forced divestments
FD/W
Industry ICB code Abs. Rel. Abs. Rel. Abs. Rel.
Oil & Gas 1 41 35.34% 30 38.96% 11 28.21% 35.43%
Basic Materials 1000 27 23.28% 17 22.08% 10 25.64% 58.82%
Industrials 2000 13 11.21% 8 10.39% 5 12.82% 62.50%
Consumer goods 3000 7 6.03% 6 7.79% 1 2.56% 16.67%
Health care 4000 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
Consumer Serv. 5000 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
Telecom 6000 3 2.59% 1 1.30% 2 5.13% 200%
Utilities 7000 16 13.79% 7 9.09% 9 23.08% 107%
Financials 8000 9 7.76% 8 10.39% 1 2.56% 12.50%
Total 116 116 100% 77 100% 39 100%
only 12.5%of thewarningswere followedby forced divestments. In contrast, communications
(ICB 6000) and utilities (ICB 7000) are associated with a large proportion of warnings ending
up as effective forced divestments. Firms pertaining to Oil & Gas sector (ICB 1000) display a
relatively lower proportion20, whereas Basic materials and Industrial are above average. In
the case of the Oil & Gas industry, a possible explanation of the relatively low ￿gure is the na-
ture of the deals made by host governments in this sector: oftentimes, they would aim for a
controlling stake, instead of a 100% stake21.
4.2 Stock prices and market data
We use log-returns on the stocks’ total return index provided by Data Stream, which controls
for dividends. Regarding the market variables, since we deal with stocks from all over the
world, we calculate the market returns rm,t on the index provided by DataStream for each
market. These are value-weighted indexes for each stock market. In our robustness checks,
we use the ICB industry index provided byDataStream instead of themarket index to estimate
abnormal returns. The reason for using data from the homemarket of the parent company is
that usually the stocks are more liquid there than in other exchanges, due to the well-known
"home-bias" effect.
5 Results, robustness and sub-samples
5.1 Baseline results: Reaction of the stock market
In this section, we estimate the model given by equation 1, using Datastream’s local market
index, and obtain CARs as expressed in equation 3. As for the event window, we consider
several speci￿cations. First, we assume that the market does not anticipate the events. This is
tested with the [0, 0] and [0, 5] windows; the latter accounts for the possibility that the market
needs an extended learning period, while the ￿rst one assumes that the market immediately
digests all relevant information on the event day. Next, we allow for the market to anticipate
the event, so that abnormal returns appear a few days before the event. Therefore, we use the
[-5, 0] and [-5, 5] windows.
Table 5.1 presents mean CARs as predicted from the model in equation 1. We ￿nd that,
overall, expropriation-related events, generate an average signi￿cant loss of 1.09%on the event
that some of the warnings that we analyze ended up as forced divestments, without being included in our sample.
20The big exception was Libya, where the civil unrest started almost just after the government threatened to
nationalize the oil sector.
21In the oil sector nationalization processes in Venezuela, for example, the announcement affected all the op-
erating ￿rms, but the actual nationalization (transfer of shares) only affected those ￿rms with controlling stakes in
the projects.
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day, and that themarket keeps learning about these events, as the loss accumulates to a signif-
icant 1.41 % ￿ve days after the events. However, we do not ￿nd evidence ofmarket anticipation
because losses on the [-5, 0] and [-5, 5] windows are below the ones in the [0, 0] and [0, 5] win-
dows. This is corroborated in Figure 5.1, since the biggest losses are observed after the event
has occurred22.
Table 5.1: Average CARs, traditional methodology
Event type
CAR window Events
[0,0] [0,5] [-5,0] [-5,5]
Full sample -1.0979%* -1.4001%** -0.88% -1.1811%* 116
Pre-expropriation warnings -1.0130%* -1.9591%*** -0.44% -1.3872%*** 77
Ann. Nationaliz. -0.21% 1.19% 0.71% 2.11% 37
Ann. Exprop. -2.42% -11.28% 7.01% -1.86% 1
Occupation 0.17% -2.01% -0.14% -2.32% 11
Threat -2.0525%* -3.9548%*** -2.15% -4.0478%** 22
Transitory Revocation -4.6808%** -12.4701%** -4.1086%** -11.8978%*** 6
Forced Divestments -1.27% -0.26% -1.82% -0.81% 39
Expropriations -2.09% -2.07% -2.67% -2.65% 21
Forced Sales 0.11% 2.5520%* 1.4041%* 3.8423%*** 14
Permanent revocation -1.99% -0.70% -10.0456%*** -8.75% 4
Note: Average CARs obtained from estimation of equation (1), excluding from the sample log returns with absolute value
above 40%. Signi￿cance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are identi￿ed by *, **, and ***, respectively, and are based on the Generalized
Rank T-test proposed by Kolari and Pynnonen (2011), using the asymptotic distribution of the test, and con￿rming these results
by the means of its exact distribution.
Figure 5.1: Average CARs: Full sample
Note: Cumulative abnormal returns from estimation of equation 1, excluding from
the sample log returns with absolute value above 40%. Event window centered in the
event date.
Whenwe analyze by type of event, we ￿nd that pre-expropriationwarnings convey a bor-
derline signi￿cant loss of 1.01% on the event day that increases to a signi￿cant 1.96% over a
￿ve-day period. Disaggregating warnings, our results seem to support Hypothesis 1a, since
we ￿nd that announcements of nationalization do not have clear effects on the stock price
of parent ￿rms. As for Hypothesis 1b, although we cannot provide signi￿cance levels for the
only announcement of expropriation left in our sample, there are signs of themarket reacting
negatively on the event day and continuing to learn about it over a ￿ve-day period. Graphical
inspection of the CARs in Figure 5.2 agrees with this result; what is more, it suggests that the
expropriation announcement came as a big surprise for themarket. Hypothesis 1c, that occu-
pations have a negative effect on the parent ￿rms’ stock returns, is not supported by our data,
22A look at Figure 5.1 suggests exploring the possibility that the market anticipates these news only one or two
days before the event. Although not reported here, the results for event windows of [-2, 0], [-2, 2] and [-2, 5] do
not show a signi￿cant anticipation effect either.
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although the CARs do move in the expected direction, as con￿rmed by Figure 5.2. This may
suggest that occupations are not taken as credible threats by the market.
Hypothesis 1d is supported, since threats imply a borderline signi￿cant loss of 2.05% on
the event day that adds up to a signi￿cant 3.96% loss when we allow for an extended learn-
ing period. Finally, Hypothesis 1e goes in line with the results observed for transitory permit
revocations, which are associated with a large and signi￿cant market response: on the event
day, the mean fall in parent ￿rms’ stock prices is 4.68%, and the loss keeps growing to a signif-
icant 12.47% ￿ve days after the revocation of the permit. Although losses on the [-5, 0] and [-5,
5] windows are signi￿cant, they provide little evidence of the market anticipating the event,
when we compare their CARs magnitude with the [0, 0] and [0, 5] windows. This is consistent
with the evolution of CARs presented on the rightmost panel of Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: Average CARs: Pre-expropriationWarnings, by type of event
Note: Cumulative abnormal returns from estimation of equation (1), excluding from the sample log returns with absolute
value above 40%. Event window centered in the event date.
Forced divestments as a whole are not signi￿cant. Analyzing each type of forced divest-
ment, we ￿nd that forced sales do not generate signi￿cant abnormal returns on the event day,
but are associated with a borderline signi￿cant gain of 2.55% that accumulates over ￿ve days
after the event day (i.e. [0, 5] window). Anticipation of the event also plays an important role:
there are signi￿cant mean gains of 1.40% and 3.84% that appear when we calculate CARs for
the [-5, 0] and [-5, 5] windows. Figure 5.3 lets us appreciate this dynamics more clearly: there
is a clear positive trend for the CARs during the event window. This is consistent with Hy-
pothesis 2a: in view of the catastrophic alternative of an expropriation, the fact that the parent
￿rm can close a deal with the government to sell its assets may seem quite a positive result to
market participants. Besides, anticipation is a plausible result if we consider that information
leakages may arise from the company’s side, since it is its decision to accept the government’s
deal at last.
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Outright expropriations do not have a signi￿cant impact on the stock price of the parent
￿rms, although the graphic evolution of CARs in Figure 5.3 shows a small negative cumulative
market response around the event day. Thismeans that Hypothesis 2b is not supported by our
data, which is somewhat puzzling, since the nature of the event implies the loss of property or
control rights over a facility, and thus its expected future stream of cash ￿ows –let alone the
high probability of obtaining no compensation for the subsidiary-. However, taking a closer
look to the sample of outright expropriations, only 5 out of our 14 events are what we could
call "surprising expropriations": they were not associated with previous warnings by the host
government. This suggests that the information may have been incorporated by the time the
expropriation ￿nally occurred.
Finally, permanent rescissions are associated with negative effects in all cases, but only
convey a signi￿cant loss of 10.05% over the [-5, 0] window, meaning that the market largely
anticipates the event, but that its effect over the stock price vanishes quickly from themarket,
as Figure 5.3 seems to imply. Thus, we ￿nd some support for Hypothesis 2c.
Figure 5.3: Average CARs: Forced Divestments, by type of event
Note: Cumulative abnormal returns from estimation of equation (1), excluding from
the sample log returns with absolute value above 40%. Event window centered in the
event date.
In summary, at the aggregate level we ￿nd that expropriation-related events are associated
with a signi￿cant loss on the event day. However, we do not ￿nd evidence of the market
anticipating the events. In the case of warnings, there is a signi￿cant loss on the event day that
increases twofold over a ￿ve-day period. Disaggregating warnings, we ￿nd some support for
Hypothesis 1a, 1d and 1e, but the support is less clear in the case of Hypothesis 1c. The group
of forced divestments does not have a signi￿cant effect. Analyzing each type, we ￿nd that
the results for forced Sales are consistent with Hypothesis 2a, and the results for permanent
rescissions are consistentwithHypothesis 2c. However, the results for outright expropriations
do not support Hypothesis 2b.
5.2 Robustness checks
5.2.1 Alternative methodology
In order to test whether our results are subject to the methodology we have employed, we
use an alternative speci￿cation motivated by Dube et al. (2011), which captures the abnormal
returns as a shock to the parent ￿rm stock returns. The model we estimate is:
ri,t = ↵i +  irm,t +  eEi,t(k) + ui,t (4)
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Where ri,t is the return on ￿rm i’s stock price, rm,t is the return on the market index23, and
Ei,t(k) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one during the k-day length event win-
dow, and zero otherwise24. In that fashion, this model lets parameter  e measure the average
daily abnormal return over the k-day period, for event type e, as a transitory shock to the
process. The cumulative abnormal return is then computed as k e. As in the case of the tra-
ditional methodology, we consider different speci￿cations for the CAR period, for t ranging
between 5 and 5, with zero representing the event day. Equation 4 is estimated for a window
t 2 [ 245, 25].
Table 5.2 presents the results of the estimation of Equation 4 for each event category, as
well as for the whole sample. We can appreciate that the events effects are virtually the same
as in the traditional event study methodology. Furthermore, given the setting of the model
in equation 4, we can now supply some signi￿cance for the effect of the announcement of
expropriation in our sample: in line with the results observed in Figure 5.2, the event comes
as quite a shock to the market on the announcement day, with a signi￿cant loss of 2.39% that
keeps accumulating during ￿ve days after the event. Thus, we can now talk about a partial
support for Hypothesis 2b, with a careful reading of the result25.
Table 5.2: Average CARs, alternative methodology.
Event type
CAR window Events
[0,0] [0,5] [-5,0] [-5,5]
Full sample -1.1027%** -1.4688%* -0.91% -1.27% 116
Pre-expropriation warnings -1.0430%** -2.0575%** -0.52% -1.54% 77
Ann. Nationaliz. -0.25% 1.09% 0.64% 2.02% 37
Ann. Exprop. -2.3909%*** -11.7468%* 7.27% -1.97% 1
Occupation 0.17% -2.1499%* -0.21% -2.58% 11
Threat -2.09% -4.1632%* -2.29% -4.4034%* 22
Transitory Revocation -4.6796%** -11.7874%*** -3.43% -11.3383%** 6
Forced Divestments -1.22% -0.27% -1.71% -0.72% 39
Expropriations -2.00% -1.88% -2.19% -2.06% 21
Forced Sales 0.11% 2.3411%** 1.29% 3.5463%** 14
Permanent revocation -2.00% -0.47% -10.1934%** -8.75% 4
Note: We calculate average CARs as k e from the estimation of equation 4, using Data Stream market index and robust
standard errors. Signi￿cance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are identi￿ed by *, **, and ***, respectively, and based on the largest
between robust and cluster standard errors. We exclude from the sample log returns with absolute value above 40%.
The fact that the results obtained through both methodologies are so similar allows for
us to con￿rm that expropriation actions do affect the stock price of parent ￿rms, and that
different types of actions imply different reactions of the stock market. Of particular interest
is the effect of forced sales on stock prices of parent ￿rms, which so far has been thought to be
negative (e.g. Shcherbakova (2010)). The possibility of the ￿rm coming to an agreement with
the government towards the sale of its stake in the host country sends the market a positive
signal: in spite of possible delays in the payment, and a transfer of assets below fair value, it is
much more positive than the catastrophic alternative of an expropriation.
23The regression estimated by Dube et al. (2011) includes four Fama-French factors. In our setting, however, we
restrict themodel to include only themarket index. The reason is that data for the four-factor Fama-Frenchmodel
are available only for U.S. ￿rms, whereas our sample contains parent ￿rms based in several countries.
24In principle,Ei,t(k) = 1 represents the case where the whole ￿rm is at stake of being subject of forced divest-
ment. Dube et al. (2011) interact the associated parameter  e by the value of the subsidiary relative to the parent
￿rm to estimate the actual reaction of the market. However, given the dif￿culty to obtain accurate information on
subsidiary value for our sample, we leave this issue for a posterior part of our research.
25The announcement of expropriation involved a Mexican food producer’s operations in Venezuela, and it oc-
curred after the ￿rm had been subject to a previous occupation.
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5.2.2 Time-Shifted placebos
In order to make sure that the signi￿cance of our results is not a mere coincidence, in the
fashion of Dube et al. (2011) and Luechinger and Moser (2014), we shift our events 20, 40, and
60 days backwards and then estimate the market model (equation 1). Table 5.2.2 presents
the results for the 1-day and 11-day windows. Except for permanent revocations, none of the
CARs associated with our event types are signi￿cant –even at the 10% level. A closer look at
the case of permanent revocations, where we have three ￿rms with four revoked permits,
indicates that they were subject to several other events during these dates: negative earnings
reports (Crystallex and Anglo-American PLC), transitory permit revocations (First Quantum
Minerals), and generalized industry movements in the home country (Anglo American). Thus,
these results seem to support that theCARswe￿nd signi￿cant are a consequenceof the events
that we study and proves the importance of looking for confounding effects on the dates of
interest.
Table 5.3: Average CARs for time-shifted placebos
Event type –60 days shift –40 days shift –20 days shift
[-60,-60] [-65,-55] [-40,-40] [-45,-35] [-20,-20] [-25,-15]
Pre-ExpropriationWarnings
Ann. Nationaliz. -0.3505% 1.4111% -0.3984% 0.6655% 0.0869% 2.2340%
(0.69) (0.91) (0.19) (0.66) (0.63) (0.89)
Ann. Exprop. -2.3789% -1.9342% 2.0125% -1.0626% -0.2278% 0.0409%
– – – – – –
Occupation 0.4208% 2.8162% -0.4702% -1.0688% -0.6245% -0.1200%
(0.31) (0.91) (0.11) (0.21) (0.15) (0.62)
Threat 1.2549% 4.0360% 0.5789% -1.8096% -0.2148% 1.0899%
(0.93) (0.92) (0.83) (0.12) (0.36) (0.48)
Transitory Revocation 0.4588% -1.8241% -0.4756% 1.7809% 1.7343% -2.8945%
(0.68) (0.5) (0.66) (0.36) (0.9) (0.14)
Forced Divestments
Expropriations -0.7474% -1.8682% 0.3045% 1.5654% 0.9031% -0.3610%
(0.31) (0.29) (0.57) (0.29) (0.56) (0.52)
Forced Sales 0.1847% 1.5813% -0.3593% -2.3812% -0.3411% -0.2293%
(0.31) (0.12) (0.69) (0.99) (0.92) (0.9)
Permanent revocation -0.3004% -6.9791%*** 0.9999% -0.5880% -1.0564% -5.8745%***
(0.21) (0) (0.51) (0.78) (0.11) (0)
Note: Average CARs obtained from estimation of equation 1. We use an estimation window of [-245,-130], and exclude
from the sample log returns with absolute value above 40%. P-values in parentheses. Signi￿cance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are
identi￿ed by *, **, and ***, respectively, and are based on the Generalized Rank T-test proposed by Kolari and Pynnonen (2011),
using the asymptotic distribution of the test, and con￿rming these results by the means of its exact distribution.
5.2.3 Industry effects
We estimate Equation 1 using the ICB industry index provided by DataStream with the aim
of controlling for industry speci￿c effects. Table 5.4 presents average CARs for the events in
our sample. In general, CARs here are somewhat smaller than in our baseline results, but
the magnitude, the direction of the effect, and the signi￿cance level still hold. There is one
exception in the case of forced sales, but the magnitude, and the slightly above 10% p-value
for the [-5,5] window CARs suggest that the intuition obtained with the full market index is
still valid. Again, it is worth noting that our results should be read with caution, given the
small sample size for the individual types of events.
5.3 The effect of Venezuela
Given the importance of Venezuela within our sample (more than 50% of the events), it is
worth exploring to what extent results change once we exclude this country from the sample,
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Table 5.4: Average CARs using World Sector Index
Event type CAR window Number of events
[0,0] [0,5] [-5,0] [-5,5]
Full sample -0.9959% -1.3534%** -1.0327% -1.3902%** 116
Pre-expropriation warnings -0.8295% -1.5260%*** -0.6579%* -1.3545%*** 77
Ann. Nationaliz. 0.0859% 1.5511% 0.4099% 1.8751% 37
Ann. Exprop. -2.5994% -13.2365% 9.0474% -1.5896% 1
Occupation 0.3659% -1.7681% 0.1681% -1.9659% 11
Threat -2.1045%* -4.0834%*** -3.0469%** -5.0258%*** 22
Transitory Revocation -4.2691%*** -9.0005% -2.6954%* -7.4268% 6
Forced Divestments -1.3287% -1.0133% -1.8471% -1.5316% 39
Expropriations -2.1969% -2.5529% -2.8094% -3.1655% 21
Forced Sales 0.1325% 1.8112% 1.0673% 2.7459% 14
(0.27) (0.30) (0.22) (0.13)
Permanent revocation -2.1021% -3.0178% -8.2605%** -9.1762%* 4
Note: Cumulative abnormal returns from estimation of equation 1, using DataStream’s Level 2 World Industry Index as
regressor. We exclude from the sample log returns with absolute value above 40%, and center the event window at the event
date. Signi￿cance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are identi￿ed by *, **, and ***, respectively, and are based on the Generalized Rank
T-test proposed by Kolari and Pynnonen (2011), using the asymptotic distribution of the test, and con￿rming these results by the
means of its exact distribution. P-values in parentheses for the case of forced sales.
as well as the dynamics of market reactions in Venezuela as separate case. Since Venezuela
constitutes a unique scenario where expropriations were the order of the day, we expect the
market to incorporate all the information regarding the expropriation risk facing ￿rms that
had operations in the country during the period we study. In that sense, this setting offers
the perfect opportunity to check whether the market thinks of pre-expropriation warnings
as credible threats. If that is the case, we should observe a larger abnormal market reaction
towards pre-expropriation warnings than in the case of other countries.
Tables 5.5 through 5.8 present the results for the samples ex-Venezuela (tables 5.5 and 5.6),
and Venezuela (tables 5.7 and 5.8), using both the traditional event studymethodology and the
alternative proposed by Dube et al. (2011). As before, very similar results are obtained through
both methods, but in this case their statistical signi￿cance only coincides in some types of
events.
In the ex-Venezuela sample, we do not ￿nd signi￿cant reactions from the market in the
full sample or in the group of pre-expropriation warnings. In the latter group, only transi-
tory revocations convey a signi￿cant loss of about 4.6% on the event day and that the market
needs some time to adjust to the news, since the return accumulated over a ￿ve-day period
is a signi￿cant -7.5%; this is the case for both methodologies, which suggests that our results
are robust. In the case of forced divestments, permanent revocations convey a signi￿cant loss
of around 5.6% during the event day, while Forced Sales are associated with a signi￿cant gain
accumulated ￿ve days following the event, and over an 11-day window: there is both antici-
pation and learning for this type of event. This is consistent with the idea that there may be
information leakages on the ￿rm’s willingness to close the deal with the host government.
In contrast with the results above, for the sample of Venezuela, we ￿nd that the set of
pre-expropriation warnings generates a rather large abnormally negative market response.
The results also suggest that the market takes some time in digesting the news, as the loss
accumulates ￿ve days after the event. Besides, to some extent, there is anticipation as the
loss is bigger for the [-5, 5] window than for the [0, 5] window. Disaggregating by type of
event, although we cannot provide meaningful results based on the traditional methodology
for transitory revocations and announcement of expropriation (there is only one of each left
in our sample), the alternative methodology suggests that these are highly signi￿cant. For the
case of the expropriation announcement, the results suggest that it comes as a surprise for the
market, which requires some time to fully digest the news, since the returns for the [-5, 0] and
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Table 5.5: Traditional Methodology, Rest of the world
Event type CAR window Events
[0,0] [0,5] [-5,0] [-5,5]
Full sample -1.14% -1.4786%* 0.04% -0.30% 68
Pre-expropriation warnings -0.53% -0.8136%** 1.09% 0.81% 53
Ann. Nationaliz. -0.13% 1.91% 2.88% 4.92% 14
Ann. Exprop. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 0
Occupation 0.47% -2.7100%*** 2.9358%** -0.24% 2
Threat 0.25% -0.8218%* 0.63% -0.44% 17
Transitory Revocation -4.6808%** -7.5343%** -3.2860%** -6.1395%*** 5
Forced Divestments -2.67% -3.20% -2.72% -3.25% 15
Expropriations -3.29% -7.04% -3.65% -7.40% 9
Forced Sales 0.16% 9.2833%* 2.64% 11.7666%* 4
Permanent revocation -5.5801%*** -3.91% -10.2138%*** -8.5411%* 2
Note: Cumulative abnormal returns from estimation of equation 1, excluding from the sample log returns with absolute
value above 40%. Event window centered in the event date. Signi￿cance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are identi￿ed by *, **, and
***, respectively, and are based on the Generalized Rank T-test proposed by Kolari and Pynnonen (2011), using the asymptotic
distribution of the test, and con￿rming these results by the means of its exact distribution.
Table 5.6: Alternative Methodology, Rest of the world
Event type
CAR window Events
[0,0] [0,5] [-5,0] [-5,5]
Full sample -1.12% -1.49% -0.02% -0.35% 68
Pre-expropriation warnings -0.55% -0.88% 0.97% 0.66% 53
Ann. Nationaliz. -0.17% 1.78% 2.71% 4.7665%* 14
Ann. Exprop. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 0
Occupation 0.48% -3.20% 3.09% -0.08% 2
Threat 0.24% -0.87% 0.45% -0.70% 17
Transitory Revocation -4.6796%** -7.4902%** -3.29% -6.12% 5
Forced Divestments -2.56% -3.14% -2.64% -3.04% 15
Expropriations -3.07% -6.92% -3.10% -6.97% 9
Forced Sales 0.09% 7.6816%** 2.23% 9.4728%** 4
Permanent revocation -5.6393%*** -4.05% -10.48% -8.99% 2
Note: We calculate average CARs as k e from the estimation of equation 4, using Data Stream market index. Signi￿cance
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are identi￿ed by *, **, and ***, respectively, and are based on on the largest between robust and cluster
standard errors. We exclude from the sample log returns with absolute value above 40%.
the [-5, 5] windows are not signi￿cant, while returns for the [0, 0] and the [0, 5] windows are
substantial and signi￿cant. As for the transitory revocation, the results suggest a large reaction
from the market over the ￿ve days that follow the event, as well as some anticipation. Threats
are also associated with large negative market responses that are signi￿cant, and suggest both
learning and anticipation. These results are consistent with the idea that, given the history
of forced divestments in this country, any warning made by the government regarding the
possible involuntary divestment of a ￿rm is interpreted by the market as a credible threat.
In the case of actual forced divestments, we￿nd that themarket anticipates the permanent
revocation of permits for the two cases in our sample, since during the ￿ve days previous to
the event and up to its occurrence, the loss is above 8.8% (for both estimations). There is a
rebound effect because the return on the event day is a positive and signi￿cant 1.6%, but the
rebound is not signi￿cant during the ￿ve days after the event.
6 Explaining CARs: The effect of sector vulnerability and political
risk
Several variables may offer clues about the likelihood of an expropriation related event’s oc-
currence, providing investors with valuable information. For example, as stated in Section 4,
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Table 5.7: Traditional Methodology, Venezuela
Event type CAR window Events
[0,0] [0,5] [-5,0] [-5,5]
Full sample -1.07% -1.3315%* -1.64% -1.91% 63
Pre-expropriation warnings -1.50% -3.0833%*** -1.9519%* -3.5378%*** 39
Ann. Nationaliz. -0.27% 0.7539%** -0.62% 0.40% 23
Ann. Exprop. -2.42% -11.28% 7.01% -1.86% 1
Occupation 0.11% -1.87% -0.87% -2.84% 9
Threat -9.8691%*** -14.6068%*** -12.2875%* -17.0252%** 5
Transitory Revocation n.d -32.47% -3.82% -36.28% 1
Forced Divestments -0.35% 1.50% -1.15% 0.70% 24
Expropriations -1.1133%** 1.91% -1.75% 1.28% 12
Forced Sales 0.10% 0.68% 0.91% 1.4935%** 10
Permanent revocation 1.6053%*** 3.32% -8.8030%* -7.09% 2
Note: Cumulative abnormal returns from estimation of equation 1, excluding from the sample log returns with absolute
value above 40%. Event window centered in the event date. Signi￿cance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are identi￿ed by *, **, and
***, respectively, and are based on the Generalized Rank T-test proposed by Kolari and Pynnonen (2011), using the asymptotic
distribution of the test, and con￿rming these results by the means of its exact distribution.
Table 5.8: Alternative Methodology, Venezuela
Event type
CAR window Events
[0,0] [0,5] [-5,0] [-5,5]
Full sample -1.0896%* -1.45% -1.6520%* -2.03% 63
Pre-expropriation warnings -1.5412%* -3.2195%** -1.96% -3.6797%** 39
Ann. Nationaliz. -0.30% 0.66% -0.62% 0.34% 23
Ann. Exprop. -2.3909%*** -11.7468%* 7.27% -1.97% 1
Occupation 0.10% -1.95% -0.97% -3.0955%* 9
Threat -9.9917%* -15.3754%* -11.64% -16.9337%* 5
Transitory Revocation n.d. -37.6055%*** -4.22% -38.8911%*** 1
Forced Divestments -0.35% 1.45% -1.15% 0.65% 24
Expropriations -1.13% 1.86% -1.56% 1.44% 12
Forced Sales 0.12% 0.59% 0.91% 1.41% 10
Permanent revocation 1.6148%*** 3.43% -9.8811%* -8.50% 2
Note: We calculate average CARs as k e from the estimation of equation 4, using Data Stream market index and robust
standard errors. Signi￿cance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are identi￿ed by *, **, and ***, respectively, and are based on on the
largest between robust and cluster standard errors. We exclude from the sample log returns with absolute value above 40%.
￿rms operating in some sectors are more likely to be forced to divest. In particular, Table 4.2
indicates that Oil & Gas, Basicmaterials, and Utilities sectors are themost vulnerable to forced
divestments. This sectorial characteristicmay shape investors reaction towards governmental
measures related to forced divestments. In order to determine the effect of sector vulnera-
bility on the size of CARs, we de￿ne a dummy variable Vi that takes the value of one when the
￿rm operates in a vulnerable sector, and zero otherwise. Nevertheless, as we have explained,
nationalizations are a very special case of forced divestments, with a different impact on the
size of CARs. Therefore, we add a variable, Ni, that is equal to one if the event is a nation-
alization, and a variable NVi, which is an interaction term between Vi and Ni. The model is
presented in equation 5.
CARi =  0 +  1Ni +  2Vi +  3NVi + ✏i (5)
In principle, if the sector were vulnerable, onewould expect investors to incorporate such
information into their valuation, so that the reaction of stock prices is somewhat smallerwhen
the event takes place. However, this may not be the case for nationalizations. To see why, re-
member that for forced sales, we expect (and ￿nd) CARs to be positive for this type of event
because (i) there is a large uncertainty that gets resolved the day the ￿rm agrees to the nation-
alization of its subsidiary, and (ii) nationalizations can be considered the lesser of two evils.
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Besides, the fact that a sector is vulnerable means that the government is fond of it. All this
results in a lower success probability assigned to the positive outcome of a forced sale in a
vulnerable sector than in one that is not vulnerable: when the nationalization is realized in a
vulnerable sector, the market’s reaction is stronger. This being said, we expect  1 < 0,  2 > 0,
 3 > 0.
The second and third columns of Table 6.1 present the results for equation 5 for the [0,0]
and [0,5] windows. Abnormal returns on the event day have a positive and signi￿cant rela-
tionshipwithNV , which is the interaction between vulnerability and nationalization. The fact
that  3 > 0 implies that themarket’s reaction is much stronger for nationalizations carried out
in vulnerable sectors, providing some support for our hypothesis.
Table 6.1: CARs, vulnerability and political risk
Vulnerability Political risk
Dep. Var.: CARs [0, 0] [0, 5] [0, 0] [0, 5]
Ni -0.00006 -0.00267 - -
Vi -0.01258 0.00603 - -
NVi 0.01903** 0.05246* - -
Pi - - -0.00053 -0.00009
NPi - - 0.00031*** 0.00091**
Constant -0.00387 -0.02308*** 0.01095 -0.01485
R-squared 0.0216 0.0233 0.017 0.0183
n 114 114 112 112
Note: CARs obtained from estimating equation 1 constitute the dependent variable for all models in the table, using Huber-
White robust standard errors.
However, besides sector vulnerability, the level of political risk of the host country may
also explain the size of the response towards an expropriation related action. Investors can
access different measures or proxies for political risk through either readily available indexes
or, well, the news. To estimate the impact of this variable on the size of CARs, we use PRS
Group’s Regional Political Risk Index26, which is free to access on PRS’s website. The index
represents an overall measure of risk for a given country, taking into account variables such
as turmoil, expropriation, and other risks.
The idea behind the model presented in equation 6 is similar in spirit to that presented in
the case of vulnerability. We would expect that if the event is a nationalization, the larger the
level of political risk, the larger the CARs. This is because investors might have a perception
that riskier countries are associated with a larger probability of the nationalization process
ending in the catastrophic alternative of expropriation.
CARi =  0 +  1Pi +  2NPi + ✏i (6)
According to the columns (4) and (5) of Table 6.1, the only signi￿cant variable in regression
(6) is the interaction term, and it has the expected sign. This supports the idea that resolved
uncertainty for nationalizations occurring in an already rather uncertain environment triggers
a positive response from the market.
7 Final remarks
Events related to expropriations are likely to generate a reaction in stock returns since share-
holders risk losing their stake in the expropriated ￿rm without receiving a proper compen-
26The index, calculated annually, is available for several years at https://www.prsgroup.com/category/risk-
index. The original series decreases with political risk, but we rescale it to re￿ect a larger value as political risk
grows, just to make interpretation a bit easier.
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sation. We de￿ne expropriations, following Truitt (1970), as those events where the sovereign
seizes privately owned tangible property. However, through an extensive investigation on ex-
propriation events, we￿nd that theremay be several types of actions related to the deed of ex-
propriation. We divide these actions between pre-expropriation warnings (announcements
of expropriations, nationalizations, occupations, threats, and transitory permit revocations),
which do not necessarily imply asset seizing by the government, and the actual event of forced
divestments (forced sales, outright expropriations, and permanent permit rescissions), where
the ￿rm losses/cedes property or control rights on its business in the expropriating country.
In order to determine whether these events actually have an impact on the value of the
parent ￿rm, we conduct an event study using a novel data set. In general, as expected, we
￿nd that most expropriation related events are associated with a value loss for the parent
￿rm shareholders; among these, events associated with permit revocations are the ones that
generate the largest negative market reaction among the events in our sample. A rather un-
expected ￿nding is that outright expropriations do not appear to be a negative surprise for
the market, since we do not ￿nd any signi￿cant abnormal returns associated with them. One
possible explanation is that only ￿ve of the expropriations in our sample were unannounced.
Nevertheless, when it comes to forced sales, we no longer expect it to be a negative an-
nouncement for the parent￿rm, unlike the approach observed in the extant literature. Among
other things, this can be explained by the fact that the market may incorporate the possible
expropriation of the subsidiary into the parent ￿rm’s valuation before nationalization is re-
alized, and this incorporation has to be corrected after the positive announcement of a deal
to transfer its assets for a stipulated price, instead of having them seized. Our results show a
consistent positive reaction of the market towards forced sales, which is a novel result, as far
as we know.
When we analyze the results separating Venezuela from the rest of the world, we ￿nd
that the market interprets any pre-expropriation warning as a credible threat and tends to
react vigorously whenever the government signals the intention to expropriate. As for the
rest of the world, results for forced sales suggest anticipation and learning, indicating possible
information leakages on the side of the parent ￿rm. However, warnings do not seem to alarm
investors, suggesting that they are not necessarily taken seriously if the country is other than
Venezuela.
The cross-section of CARs suggests that these are explained to some extent by political risk
and sector vulnerability to expropriation. Particularly, our results suggest that nationalizations
are considered more positively than usual whenever the ￿rm operates in a vulnerable sector
or in a high political risk country.
Further research could use this dataset to study the reaction of parent ￿rms’ debt when a
subsidiary is affected by a governmental action that signals forced divestments, since debtors
have different incentives than shareholders. It can also be used to study more accurately de-
terminants of expropriations, as well as to analyze the impact of expropriations on sovereign
risk.
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Appendices
A Example of a Nationalization Decree
In order to illustrate the process of nationalization, we take the case of Venezuela, which we
outline in Fig. A1. In general, a nationalization process has two phases: the negotiation of
terms and conditions under which control/stock transfer is going to be executed (phase 2)
and, when appropriate, the sale of stake to the government (phase 3). In the ￿gure, Phase 1
refers to two special nationalization cases in Venezuela’s hydrocarbons sector: ￿rms had to
decide at this stage whether they agreed to be taken into account for planning the migration
from private to mixed enterprises.
Figure A.1: Scheme of a nationalization decree
B Preliminary sample
Before checking for the existence of confounding events in our sample, we found that 71 ￿rms
were affected by expropriation-related announcements 208 times (Table B1). These events
occurred in 12 countries, with Venezuela and Bolivia accounting for nearly 51% and 14% of
them, respectively.
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Table B.1: Frequency of events by type
Event type Frequency Percent
Announcement of nationalization 58 27.88%
Announcement of expropriation 5 2.40%
Occupation 19 9.13%
Threat 47 22.60%
Contract revoked or end of concession 12 5.77%
Pre-ExpropriationWarnings 141 67.79%
Outright expropriation 31 14.90%
Forced sale 30 14.42%
Permanent Rescission of Contract 6 2.88%
Forced Divestment 67 32.21%
Total sample 208 100.00%
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